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This article is an abridged version of an IGPS working paper 
of the same title published October 2013. The working paper 
was commenced earlier in the year, but completion became 
timely after the government put out a discussion document 
outlining the Flexi-Super concept and invited submissions. 
Accordingly, this is not a response to the discussion 
document per se, but rather a holistic review of the policy 
option of letting people select starting dates for New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZS). 
Conceptual basis for New Zealand 
superannuation
Behind the idea that individuals can have 
a choice about the age at which their New 
Zealand Superannuation commences 
is the notion that NZS is an individual 
entitlement: a pot of money, if you will. 
This is unambiguously wrong. The object 
of NZS, simply put, is to ensure that all 
New Zealand residents above a certain age 
(currently 65) have sufficient income to 
be able to participate in society, to at least 
a certain minimum acceptable extent.1 
The level of NZS is therefore intentionally 
above that which might be considered 
necessary to alleviate poverty, certainly in 
the sense of destitution.2
Behind this policy lies an egalitarian 
solidarity which requires a minimum 
equal income to be provided to each and 
every older New Zealander as of right.3 
It takes the form of an income stream, 
expressed in statute. A change in statute 
can change the income, and indeed 
this has happened at different times in 
the past. A change can be challenged 
politically, but it cannot be challenged 
legally because there is no property right; 
that is, there is no entitlement enforceable 
in a court of law.
Some countries do offer flexibility 
of eligibility age and a consequent 
adjustment in pension payments. 
However, most of these, such as Sweden, 
feature an individual pension entitlement 
based on individual contributions. Only 
Ireland is like New Zealand in having a 
level universal pension regardless of paid 
employment history, and Ireland offers 
no flexibility. 
The United Kingdom is moving 
towards a flat-rate pension (operating 
alongside a voluntary but strongly tax-
favoured private pension system), and 
has a deferral arrangement which permits 
any pension not taken to be accumulated 
and paid later either as a taxed lump 
sum or as additional pension. The 
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Australian means-tested flat-rate pension, 
which operates alongside tax-favoured 
compulsory superannuation savings, can 
also be deferred. But neither of these state 
pension schemes is strictly comparable to 
New Zealand’s, and neither offers early 
pension at a reduced level.
For completeness one should record 
that there are issues in respect of the 
affordability of NZS, important to its 
continuation. These are not, however, 
the focus here, and Flexi-Super does not 
purport to address them in any case.
In short, there is no legal or moral 
basis within NZS to posit an individual 
pension pot to support exercise of choice. 
Further, the core principle and purpose 
of NZS would disappear were any group 
to receive a lower amount of benefit 
than others, or were any group to receive 
more.
Technical issues
Background
The working paper on which this article is 
based sets out a detailed actuarial approach 
to establish the price of early uptake or 
deferral of NZS, and readers wanting that 
detail are referred to that paper. Here I 
discuss one by one the relevant factors in 
pricing, and then present the actuarially 
derived results from the working paper at 
the end.
The basic trade-off for early uptake 
(taking pension at age 60 instead of age 
65) is a longer period of payment against 
a lower pension. Similarly, the basic 
trade-off for deferral (taking pension 
at age 70 instead of age 65) is a shorter 
period of payment against a higher 
pension. A simplistic way of calculating 
the trade-off is to use New Zealand life 
expectancy, ignoring a small technical 
adjustment.4 From the New Zealand 
2010–12 life tables,5 life expectancy6 
at ages 60, 65 and 70 is broadly 25, 20 
and 15 years, taking the population as a 
whole and ignoring gender differences. 
Looking at early uptake first, the trade-
off is a lower pension for 25 years against 
the standard pension for 20 years. The 
proportion is 20/25; that is, ignoring all 
other considerations, the pension payable 
from age 60 should be about 20/25ths 
or 80% of the standard pension payable 
from age 65.
Similarly, for deferring the standard 
pension from age 65 to age 70 the 
proportion is 20/15, suggesting that 
the deferred pension, ignoring all other 
considerations, could be payable from 
age 70 at a level of 20/15ths or 133% of 
the standard pension.
This gives the general idea: early uptake 
from age 60 would get 80% of the age 65 
pension, deferral to age 70 would give 
133% of the age 65 pension. However, it 
is overly simplistic. To calculate the cost-
neutral percentage adjustments properly 
requires other factors to be taken into 
account.
Different rates of mortality
As is generally known, on average women 
live longer than men. Also reasonably well-
known is that on average people of higher 
socio-economic status (SES) live longer 
than those of lower SES. Possibly less 
appreciated is the way in which mortality 
rates by age have declined, particularly in 
the last 30 years, something like 2% per 
annum, thereby giving rise to appreciably 
greater longevity.
The impact of differential mortality 
for different groups works as follows. 
If one group lives longer on average 
than another, then early uptake is less 
advantageous because the reduction 
goes on for longer and hence they can 
have a greater percentage of the standard 
pension than the lesser long-lived group. 
Conversely, deferral is more advantageous 
for those who live longer, because they 
have greater time to enjoy their relatively 
higher pension, and a lesser percentage 
of the standard pension should apply 
for them compared to those who can be 
expected to die earlier. 
The extent to which mortality has 
been decreasing has been different for 
different groups – male/female, higher 
or lower SES group. Overall, however, 
ongoing decrease in mortality rates means 
people live longer, and thus, compared to 
not making any allowance for improving 
longevity, a greater percentage of the 
standard pension would apply for 
early uptake and a lesser percentage for 
deferral.
Discounting
If NZS is deferred, an income stream is 
delayed. If NZS is taken early an income 
stream is brought forward. Making 
allowance for this requires calculating the 
net present value of the different income 
streams at some appropriate discount 
rate, and then setting the percentage of the 
standard pension payable for early uptake 
or deferral as the figure required to equate 
to the net present values.
The impact of discounting on the 
early uptake percentage is to lower the 
percentage, because the immediate 
payments are of greater relative value 
than those further in the future. For the 
same reason, the impact on deferral of 
discounting is to increase the percentage. 
In other words, whichever option gives 
more right now – taking early uptake 
rather than waiting for the standard 
pension, taking the standard pension 
rather than deferral – is favoured by 
discounting.
Lost income tax receipts
Someone at age 65 earning $70,000 or 
more who can defer their NZS until they 
cease to be taxed at the highest rate will 
cause government to collect less revenue. 
Since there is no apparent policy advantage 
from allowing this tax advantage, the 
percentage adjustment for deferral should 
be calculated to ensure that there is, in 
fact, no lost revenue.
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Assumptions
The future is unknown (even to actuaries), 
so some reasonable assumptions are 
needed to calculate and discount the 
income stream options. The assumptions 
used in the working paper are: 
•	 Mortality	follows	New	Zealand	
life tables 2010–12 rates, with a 
compound decrease in mortality 
rates of 1% per annum.7
•	 The	impact	of	socio-economic	
differences is modelled by taking 
Mäori and non-Mäori mortality as 
proxies for lower and higher SES, 
with mortality rates in the higher 
SES group decreasing as above, 1% 
per annum, while rates in the lower 
SES group will decrease at a slightly 
greater rate so as to maintain the 
current differences in period life 
expectancy.8
•	 The	impact	of	income	tax	reduction	
in deferral is modelled by reducing 
NZS payments from age 65 to age 70 
for the maximum difference in tax.
•	 A	reasonable	approach	to	setting	
the discount rate would be to begin 
with a nominal risk-free rate of 5% 
p.a., reducing to 4% after tax. The 
payments of NZS are indexed to the 
greater of price inflation and wage 
growth; the Treasury in its long-term 
fiscal forecast assumes NZS will grow 
around 3.5% p.a., made up of 2% 
inflation and 1.5% real wage growth. 
This would suggest a discount rate 
of 0.5% p.a. However, to give some 
sense of the significance of this 
assumption, calculations are made 
using both a zero discount rate and 
a relatively high 3% discount rate, 
noting only that the latter assumes 
a rather higher nominal risk-free 
rate and/or lower price inflation 
and average wage growth than is 
currently the case.9 
Results
The results based on these assumptions 
are shown here for both a discount rate 
of 0% p.a. (Table 1) and a discount rate 
of 3% p.a. (Table 2). Each table shows 
early uptake and deferral percentages in 
relation to the age 65 pension for higher 
SES and lower SES groups within male 
and female. 
What may we take from this? 
Firstly, male/female differences for the 
same SES group seem small, and could 
be averaged without any great concern, 
which is useful to know. Secondly, the rate 
suggested in the government discussion 
document for early uptake was 73% of 
the standard pension. The results above 
for the lower SES group, the presumed 
target for early uptake, are either side of 
that figure, being around 77–78% at the 
0% p.a. discount and 69–71% at the 3% 
discount. Something like 75% at age 60, 
being 5% for each year before 65, appears 
not unreasonable.
Thirdly, the 160% proposed in the 
discussion document for deferral to age 
70 appears much too generous, and it 
is unclear how this figure could have 
been arrived at. The focus needs to be 
on the higher SES group (since one 
may reasonably ask who else is going 
to contemplate deferral), and the range 
of results then is between 122% (0% 
discount over wage indexing) and 132% 
(3% p.a. discount over wage indexing).10 
In my judgement, the highest 
discount rate appropriate at the current 
time for costing early uptake and deferral 
relativities should not exceed 1% pa in 
excess of wage indexation. It follows that 
the work here supports a relativity of 75% 
for early uptake and 125% for deferral 
as tentative best estimates, assuming no 
selection effects other than in respect of 
SES group.11 
An immediate implication is that 
responses to the discussion document 
in favour of a deferral option based on 
a relativity of 160% will unfortunately 
be unreliable and of no utility from a 
policy development perspective. Were the 
discussion document to have put forward 
the 125% that analysis here suggests, or 
even a tax-favoured 130%, say, it seems 
likely that enthusiasm for having choice to 
defer NZS would be considerably muted. 
A less obvious but important implication 
is the need for the government to set aside 
contingency reserves on its balance sheet 
should the proposal go ahead. There is 
clearly uncertainty in any ‘best estimate’ 
of relativities, and a private company 
would be required to hold regulatory 
capital sufficient to ensure promises 
to pay will be met in all reasonably 
foreseeable circumstances.12 
Outcomes and fiscal neutrality
Rational behaviours
When pricing options allow people to 
make voluntary choices, anyone from 
an insurance background will be very 
conscious of adverse selection. Customers 
for life insurance, for example, who are in 
poor health will get better-than-average 
value if they can obtain the insurance 
on normal terms. A person in very good 
health conversely may not consider life 
insurance worthwhile. In the section above 
on technical issues I assessed the rate for 
the early uptake option on the basis that 
it would appeal to low SES groups, and 
assumed a proxy mortality to get a rate 
which would be about right on average for 
that whole population. However, consider 
a 60-year-old diagnosed with motor 
neuron disease. Age 60 is a not uncommon 
onset age, and death before age 65 is almost 
a given in such circumstances. Someone 
in this position will opt for early uptake 
regardless of their SES group because they 
will get something rather than nothing. 
Table 1: relativities by gender and SES: zero discount
Discount: 0% Male Female
High SES Low SES High SES Low SES
Early uptake (from age 60) 80% 77% 82% 78%
Deferral (to age 70) 123% 138% 120% 134%
Table 2: relativities by gender and SES: 3% discount
Discount: 3% Male Female
High SES Low SES High SES Low SES
Early uptake (from age 60) 73% 69% 75% 71%
Deferral (to age 70) 133% 153% 130% 149%
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Fortunately motor neuron disease 
is not very widespread. However, it 
illustrates the point that when people can 
make a voluntary choice on an option 
priced on an average, then choice will give 
rise to a bias against whomever is making 
the offer. Diagnosis of terminal illness in 
one’s early 60s would almost invariably 
trigger exercise of an early uptake of NZS 
were it available with no offset.
As another example, suppose the 
deferral relativity was set higher than 
the estimated cost-neutral 125% arrived 
at above. Deferral would then become 
advantageous to those still in employment 
and earning over $70,000 p.a., and the 
people who took advantage would create 
a direct additional cost on provision of 
NZS.
In the case of insurance, companies 
underwrite applicants in order to weed 
out the more extreme cases of adverse 
selection. It is difficult to see, however, 
how the government can underwrite the 
offer of either early uptake or deferral. 
Even carrying out pricing on the basis of 
the sub-groups most likely to take up the 
option, as done in the previous section, 
will not eliminate adverse selection. It 
follows then that the government will 
inevitably lose money if people behave 
rationally, by which is meant:
•	 those	who	are	broadly	average	for	
their group may or may not take 
up the option, depending on their 
circumstances;
•	 those	who	have	characteristics	which	
make the offer poor value to them 
will not take it up;
•	 those	who	have	characteristics	which	
make the offer of particular value to 
them will take it up.
If Flexi-Super has other benefits to 
offset the adverse selection cost, then the 
government could carry out a cost-benefit 
analysis. This would, however, be a rather 
hypothetical exercise, and possibly comes 
into the ‘how long is a piece of string?’ 
category of enquiry. Whether loading 
additional costs onto NZS would ever be 
sensible must be doubtful when NZS cost 
pressures are increasing; much better to 
deal directly with concerns, as outlined 
later here.
Poor or constrained decision-making
The above discussion on choice has 
assumed rational agents, with a good 
knowledge of their own longevity pros- 
pects and high financial literacy. It is 
particularly necessary to focus on the 
early uptake choice with a different lens 
because the target, the lower SES group, 
generally have lower financial knowledge 
than the higher SES group: refer, for 
example, to the 2006 ANZ/Retirement 
Commission Financial Knowledge 
Survey. It is reasonably clear that a 
not insignificant number will fix on a 
guaranteed income to the exclusion of 
any other factors, including comfort in 
old age. Use of a low-enough percentage 
adjustment for early uptake may result 
in broad fiscal neutrality in respect of 
NZS cost alone, but either other welfare 
benefits will have to rise or greater poverty 
in old age become generally acceptable. 
And people who arrive at age 60 with no 
prospect of finding work, or are indeed 
unable to work, having been in arduous 
occupations and worn out (or poisoned 
in their work places, as were some Bay of 
Plenty timber mill workers), will not really 
have options. They will feel compelled to 
exercise early uptake, in the absence of any 
other resource. This is not choice.
A parallel is the case of Prison Service 
officers, who used to have a separate 
section of the government superannuation 
scheme. This section was compulsory and 
required members to contribute 8.5% of 
their salary in return for a pension from 
age 58 of 1.875% of final average salary. 
In 1992 the government made the scheme 
optional, allowing members to withdraw 
their own contributions, plus meagre 
interest. At the same time, subsidised 
rental housing was withdrawn. For most 
rank and file prison officers their GSF 
contribution became too onerous now 
that they had to pay market rents, and the 
lump sum was attractive, so they ‘chose’ 
to withdraw. The number in the scheme 
fell from about 1,700 in 1989 to a little 
over 600 by 1994. For most this was a 
necessary but financially disadvantageous 
‘decision’.
One could not unreasonably argue that 
those who arrive at 60 with no reasonable 
prospects of work and no other resource 
deserve better support than they obtain 
currently. But attempting to provide this 
by rearranging NZS provision is not 
giving meaningful choice. And it means 
we are abrogating our current policy of 
ensuring that those over a certain age have 
enough to live on in order to participate 
in society at least to some extent. 
Individual versus financial discounting
The technical section earlier identifies 
the significant effect of the discount rate 
in measuring value. The work of David 
Laibson and others has shown that many 
people (and not just lower SES groups) 
apply hyperbolic discounting: that is, a 
low discount for immediate payments 
but a very high discount for delayed 
payments. For those who make financial 
judgements in this fashion, early uptake 
will appear very attractive even when not 
financially sensible from a more informed 
viewpoint. Deferral, on the other hand, 
unless at a fiscally ruinous relativity will 
not be attractive even if, again, it would be 
financially sensible.13
Other considerations
It could be argued that not many people 
will exercise a choice away from age 65 
entitlement, and certainly this has been 
the experience of Australian and UK 
deferral arrangements. It could then be 
argued that the additional NZS costs 
The current Ministry of Social Development benefit 
payments system is efficient at what it does, but 
any change to what it is currently designed to do ... 
could be extremely expensive.
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described above may be insignificant in 
the scheme of things. Whether or not 
experience in New Zealand will follow 
that in Australia and the UK will depend 
on where relativities are set, especially for 
deferral. However, there will be significant 
fixed costs in establishing Flexi-Super. 
Apart from the cost of putting it in 
place, including the legislative process, 
rate-setting mechanisms and accounting 
changes, there will need to be changes 
to payment systems to cater for different 
rates. The current Ministry of Social 
Development benefit payments system is 
efficient at what it does, but any change to 
what it is currently designed to do – such 
as more than three basic NZS rates – could 
be extremely expensive. A figure of $25 
million was quoted to me when I worked 
at the ministry. The issue is the need for 
exhaustive testing of alterations, since 
interdependencies within the system are 
imperfectly understood. It follows, then, 
that if there are only a few who exercise 
a choice under Flexi-Super the overhead 
cost per head will be considerable, and 
it may be questioned whether this is a 
sensible use of taxpayer funds.
Alternatives
Deferral
If receiving NZS while working is seen as 
an issue for some, facilitating diversion 
of it into a KiwiSaver account would 
seem a low-cost option. Payments would 
be subject to PAYE as usual, and the 
accumulation uplifted when paid work 
ceases or reduces. Work and Income would 
need to offer the facility, and legislation 
may be needed to enable those who had 
attained age 65 without a KiwiSaver 
account to open one. (Whether or not 
a kickstart $1,000 would be available to 
anyone who had not already obtained one 
is worth consideration; there is an equity 
argument in favour.) The accumulation 
should be available to be taken on a 
drawdown basis, i.e. as regular non-
taxable (as income) instalments until the 
money runs out.
It may be that some in favour of 
Flexi-Super have promoted it because 
it effectively provides additional, wage-
indexed and government-guaranteed 
annuity payments in return for those 
forgone payments. If such annuity 
provision is seen as desirable from a policy 
perspective, one would think it should 
be provided openly, rather than through 
some backdoor method, and subject to full 
scrutiny and regulation.14 Be that as it may, 
some greater attention by government to 
the management options in retirement 
of accumulated KiwiSaver funds does 
appear necessary, and was included in the 
retirement commissioner’s recent review 
of retirement income policy.
Early uptake
There is good argument for greater 
resources to be provided for the worn-
out and the structurally unemployable 
than are at present available. There is no 
obvious solution to that problem other 
than a targeted benefit at or around NZS 
levels, requiring higher taxes or diversion 
of other spending.
However, for those with KiwiSaver 
balances there is an argument for relaxing 
eligibility to some extent. Allowing 
payment of a regular monthly drawdown 
payment from age 60 or later when not in 
work would seem worth exploring.
Conclusion
The basic problem with Flexi-Super is that 
it attempts to apply a financial market 
mechanism to something for which 
financial market mechanisms are just not 
appropriate. As well as being wrong in 
principle, it will inevitably cause difficul-
ties for a government in application, due 
to the impossibility of guaranteeing 
accurate pricing, the impacts of adverse 
selection, the absence of true choice for 
those with income constraints, and the 
likelihood of behaviours rather different 
from those assumed for rational agents. 
The opportunity to exercise ‘choice’ 
is held as a benefit of the proposal, but 
in this instance ‘choice’ is meaningless, 
unless one means (in the case of early 
uptake) choice between poverty now and 
poverty later, or (in both cases) the choice 
to exercise a financially advantageous 
option against the government. The first 
of these is really still no choice at all, and 
the second will inevitably add to NZS 
cost, with no other discernible benefit.
If the main problem is receipt of 
NZS while still working, this article and 
working the paper on which it is based 
put forward a pragmatic solution that 
will not disrupt NZS and will increase 
the utility of KiwiSaver. If, however, the 
underlying problem is the absence of 
any opportunity to obtain additional, 
wage-indexed annuities, then note: Wage-
indexed annuities are just not practicable 
as financial market instruments.
Annuity products generally are 
certainly desirable, but are very difficult 
to provide on a cost-neutral basis 
because of the tendency for individuals 
to apply hyperbolic discounting, making 
annuities appear unattractive on price. 
Also, for prudential reasons contingency 
reserves need to be established and held 
as segregated funds (whether provided 
publicly or privately),15 adding to cost.
It is not unreasonable to wonder why 
Flexi-Super has been proposed at all. It 
will do nothing positive for lower SES 
groups, and will be of utility only to those 
in robust good health with sufficient 
private wealth that they can allocate 
part to increasing their state pension, to 
be underwritten by all taxpayers. One 
might suppose a certain myopia in those 
responsible for policy development, and, 
at the least, a woeful lack of understanding 
of insurance principles.
1 Refer to the 1972 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social 
Security, p.65: ‘beneficiaries to enjoy a standard of living 
“much like” that of the rest of the community and which 
would enable them to participate in and belong to the 
community’. This was further supported in the 1988 Royal 
Commission on Social Policy. It may be noted that the extent 
to which this conceptual approach has been applied to 
benefits other than NZS is arguable.
2 NZS is quite successful in alleviating poverty among the 
elderly, and ranks very highly in this regard in international 
comparisons of social security systems (using a 50% of 
median income comparison). As measured by standard 
of living surveys, domestically far fewer of our over-65 
population are in hardship compared to families (parents 
with children under 18).
3 One of the ways New Zealand exercises the solidarity 
principle is to require NZS to be offset by any social security 
pension received by a New Zealand superannuitant from 
another country. This is logical in terms of the policy 
objective of NZS, but again runs counter to the idea of a 
pension pot, which may be why some confusion exists on 
this aspect of NZS policy as well.
4 Strictly speaking it should be life expectancy at age 65 
assuming one has survived from age 60 to age 65, and life 
expectancy at age 70 assuming one has survived from age 
65 to age 70.
5 Statistics New Zealand 2010–12 life tables, while based 
on actual deaths over the period 2010 to 2012 as the 
numerator, necessarily use estimates of the population as the 
denominator in the absence of census information delayed 
by the Canterbury earthquakes. They show greater relative 
improvement in male mortality than in female mortality. 
6 These are period life expectancies, assuming no change in 
mortality rates in future years.
7 This might be seen as too low by a number of experts; for a 
comprehensive discussion in the New Zealand context refer 
to O’Connell (2012).
8 There is no direct investigation of the impact of socio-
economic differences on New Zealand mortality rates, 
but the work by Blakely et al. in the Decades of Disparity 
series identifies that some 50% of the difference between 
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mortality rates for Mäori and non-Mäori can be put down 
to socio-economic factors. In a presentation, an author 
suggested that, given the limitations of their study (the 
only socio-economic factors available were those that can 
be derived from census information), rather more of that 
difference could be due to socio-economic difference. Using 
published mortality rates for Mäori and non-Mäori as proxies 
for low and high socio-economic status groups is likely to 
be conservative, as non-Mäori rates include some lower SES 
non-Mäori lives, and Mäori rates include some higher SES 
Mäori lives. The difference in period life expectancy for males 
between higher SES and lower SES groups on this approach 
is 3.8 years, and for females is 4.6 years.
9 In considering what is an appropriate discount rate the 
context is the ‘safe’ investment open to individuals in relation 
to the NZS income stream amounts, not government or 
corporate finance.
10 These results incorporate the advantage from lower tax in 
deferral. Without this, the range would be 129% to 142%. 
Even so, the likelihood that those choosing deferral will be 
longer-lived than others even within the same SES group 
counsels caution in using a higher range, even if one were 
not convinced of the need to exclude tax advantaging. 
11 Selection effects in deferral, i.e. that those choosing deferral 
will do so in the belief they will be long lived, might suggest 
a lower relativity than 125%.
12 Government will also need to record on its balance sheet: 
(1) a credit, under early uptake, for anticipated reduced NZS 
from age 65 in respect of those who elect that choice; (2) 
a debit, under deferral, for anticipated increased NZS from 
deferral age in respect of those who elect that choice. This 
will be needed to ensure transparency of NZS cost.
13 This may explain the low take-up of deferral in the UK and 
Australia.
14 As referred to earlier, pricing can never expect to be accurate, 
and the government would need to set aside reserves on the 
same basis as private annuity companies.
15 The cost of holding contingency reserves necessarily has to 
be included in the annuity price, and hence products such as 
annuities deferred to a later age, by reducing uncertainty, are 
the most promising for investigation since they require lower 
reserves.
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